Flapdoodle

An argument that superficially seems intuitively attractive, true or real, but is in fact meaningless or nonsensical.
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He was red in the face and the veins on his neck were standing out. He involuntarily spat as he shouted while furiously jabbing a scientific journal paper high into the air. “This paper proves that palliative sedation doesn’t hasten death!,” he bellowed from the audience.

The recipient of the Catholic priest’s[§] ire was Dr Rodney Syme, who had just delivered a paper at a Catholic bioethics conference in Melbourne, Australia.

The presentation didn't win over an already skeptical audience given that his address was to argue, by referring to the scientific literature, that palliative care can’t always help alleviate refractory end-of-life symptoms and that continuous deep sedation (CDS) may hasten a patient’s death.

By the end of the address the audience was bristling with hostility and our priest bolted to his feet to commence the attack.

I hadn’t seen the journal paper the priest was brandishing, so immediately after the conference I retrieved a copy and studied it.1 You can obtain your own copy here.

But first, a little background on the doctrine of double effect.

 

Doctrine of double effect

There has been ongoing debate—both scholarly and otherwise—about whether CDS (particularly the administration of higher doses of opioids) for dying patients may hasten their death. CDS may be administered where the dying patient is suffering from intolerable and otherwise unrelievable symptoms, for the purpose of relief from those symptoms through the cessation of consciousness, even if it might hasten the patient's death.

To some, this is an uncontroversial medical intervention supported by the doctrine of double effect. The doctrine is widely attributed to thirteenth century Catholic Saint Thomas Aquinas, though he probably developed it from ancient Roman principles.

The doctrine says that it is acceptable to take this kind of action if it is proportionate to the suffering of the patient, that there are no other

 

less problematic alternatives, and that the doctor's intention is to relieve the suffering and not to hasten the patient’s death.

Skeptics of the doctrine point out that it can’t be reliably determined what the doctor was actually intending when they administered CDS prior to death. They also identify that the notion that it’s OK for a doctor to kill their patient (hasten her death) as long as the doctor “doesn’t really mean to,” is ethically questionable.

So, on the one hand the doctrine of double effect is relied upon to defend doctor actions, and on the other, it is claimed that CDS doesn’t hasten death in any case.

That’s having your cake and eating it too. If CDS didn’t hasten death, doctors wouldn’t need the doctrine of double effect as a defense.

Poor methodology

Back to the brandished paper. Having read it, I don’t understand how this paper passed peer review, assuming it was indeed peer reviewed. It’s a fact of life that on occasion, even prestigious journals like Lancet and the Journal of the American Medical Association publish manuscripts that shouldn’t see the light of day. I argue that this article (from Annals of Oncology) is one of them.

The research suffers from multiple, serious methodological problems.

The research suffers from multiple, serious methodological problems. Sure, the researchers attempted to match test patients (who received CDS) with control patients (who didn’t receive CDS), by age, class, gender, reason for admission and for functional status. But there the good work ends.

Here are some of the serious methodological flaws in the study.

  1. Primary measure invalid. The authors report that they measured patient survival time from admission to hospice until death from any cause. This alone invalidates the entire study. If you say you are measuring the effects of CDS, then you have to measure from the commencement of CDS, not from some other event that is not the substance of your test.
  2. Insufficient inclusion control. There is so much variability amongst the test and control subjects that the possibility of sufficient sensitivity to detect differences is highly unlikely. For example, around half of patients (53%) were admitted for uncontrolled symptoms of many and varied kinds but were not imminently dying, while a large minority (41%) were imminently dying. There was a wide range of cancer types from slow to aggressive, and of metastatic sites. The sheer breadth of patient contexts gave rise to a survival standard deviation (68% of observed variance, 6 days) that was 50% larger than the mean survival period (4 days). Translating that into 95% confidence (two standard deviations), the variance was three times larger (12 days) than the mean (4 days). Put another way, at 95% confidence, patients survived from minus 8 days to plus 16 days (from admission, not administration of CDS). Hardly the stuff to drive assertive conclusions.
  3. Insufficient intervention assessment. The researchers considered only the administration of sedatives, not of any other medical or palliative interventions in their assessment of patient survival. What other interventions were administered, when and in what amount, and how successful were they? The authors also assumed that any necessary nutrition and hydration was given to patients (whether natural or by tube) equally across hospice units because “the best palliative care should be provided.” There was no mention of whether the various units had identical (or any) written palliative care practice standards or whether those standards were known and actually practiced by attending physicians and nurses in patient cases for this study.
  4. Insufficient intervention control. A wide range of sedative types (not just opioids) were administered in a wide range of doses for widely ranging periods of time; from sudden, light and intermittent, to heavy and continuous. Around half the patients receiving sedation received multiple different sedatives.

It is hardly surprising then, given this sorry state of affairs, that the study failed to find a significant difference in ‘survival’ between test and control groups: the design was certain to result in insufficient sensitivity. (Curiously, the CDS patients survived on average longer (12 days) than the control patients (9 days), though the difference was not statistically significant.)

Unscientific conclusion

In scientific studies—particularly those which have yet to be successfully replicated by other researchers—best practice dictates that the minimum ‘significance’ is cautiously attributed to the results. The minimum significance in this case would be that “our study did not find evidence to support the contention that administration of sedation hastens patient death”.

The conclusion asserted by the researchers
is not established by the study.

The next level of attribution is still cautious, but a little more assertive: “the results suggest that the administration of sedation doesn’t hasten patient death”. It is my belief, especially given the poor design and conduct of the study, that this level of attribution would be too high.

But the authors went all out. They categorically concluded that “PST [palliative sedation therapy] does not shorten life” and trumpeted it in the article’s title: “Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death.” On the basis of this unjustifiable interpretation they further categorically concluded that the doctrine of double effect is therefore unnecessary.

The authors in my view committed a serious scientific blunder in translating an exploratory and poorly-designed study into unqualified and assertive, unsupported conclusions. How this passed peer and editorial review is a mystery.

The upshot

The upshot of this is that our priest, perhaps with an understandable deficit of expertise in scientific endeavour, grabbed a paper that supported his hypothesis and fervently believed it to provide unarguable evidence, given its unequivocal title and conclusion.

In reality, each and every paper published in scientific journals has to be read and judged on its own merits. It is not appropriate to simply accept a study’s conclusions merely by virtue of its publication in a journal, even a prestigious one.

In reality, each and every paper published in scientific journals has to be read and
judged on its own merits.

Critical appraisal (including cross-checking other sources) is the scientific standard of practice I employ as I follow trains of research and commentary on various facets of end-of-life decisions and assisted dying, across my literature collection now well in excess of five thousand journal articles, theses, books, professional policy papers and other sources.

It is a standard I commend to everyone in order to hone in on the truth and to avoid dissemination of flapdoodle, fudge and fiction.

References

1    Maltoni, M, Pittureri, C, Scarpi, E, Piccinini, L, Martini, F, Turci, P, Montanari, L, Nanni, O & Amadori, D 2009, 'Palliative sedation therapy does not hasten death: results from a prospective multicenter study', Ann Oncol, 20(7), pp. 1163-9.


[§] The meeting was conducted under Chatham House rules, so what was said can be reported, but who said it cannot.

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Bulldust is often advanced by opponents of assisted dying law reform—a reform which most citizens want—to scare or bamboozle us against the reform.

Why is there so much misinformation about? The answer is straightforward: because so far it's worked.

More than academic niceties

This isn't just an academic argument about getting the facts right. It's a fundamental battle between different world views, where misinformation against assisted dying law reform has often held sway. Here are just two real examples:

Examples of real impacts of misinformation

  1. In Australia, in every Parliamentary debate over an assisted dying Bill before them, numbers of opposed politicians have quoted the rhetorical sham "the vulnerable will be at risk" (see why it's a sham here). With the exception of the Northern Territory's Rights of the Terminally Ill Act in 1996, every Bill before Australian Parliaments has been lost or filibustered until the end of the Parliamentary term on this fearmongering. And the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act was annulled by the Federal Parliament in 1997 on the same grounds.
     
  2. In Ireland, the High Court made a determination as to whether Marie Fleming, with advanced multiple sclerosis, was constitutionally allowed to receive assisted dying (Fleming v. Ireland and Ors 2012 10589 P). The court rejected Fleming's claim, saying that the "strikingly high" rates of non-voluntary euthanasia in Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium "speaks for itself as to the risks involved". But sound research shows that the rates in these countries are similar to rates in other countries without assisted dying laws: evidence of the high degree of 'evidential' bull that was served up to their Honours.

It's time to stop the bull in its tracks

DyingForChoice.com believes it's time for the bull, the misinformation, to stop. It is unacceptable for rational citizens to be denied freedoms on the basis of scaremongering and erroneous information. This is the purpose of the F files. It provides citizens, politicians, policy advisors, healthcare workers, media professionals, researchers and others the evidence, arguments and resources to be properly informed and to avoid misinformation.

 

The F Files

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“The vulnerable will be at risk if we legalise assisted dying.”

This silly, nonsensical statement (flapdoodle) is promoted frequently and persistently in opposition to assisted dying law reform. Various forms are advanced not only by lobbyists, commentators, journalists and politicians, but even by judges and professional medical bodies (see the Appendix).

But why is this statement, and ones like it, just so much flapdoodle? The reason is because it’s false and self-serving rhetoric dressed up as a profound or self-evidential truth. Here’s the Full Monty on how this simple deception works.

What’s the argument?

The argument is structured in such a way that an original group (in this case ‘the vulnerable’) is claimed to morph into a new, different group (those ‘at risk’) on the basis of some approved or disapproved action introduced as a change statement (‘legalise assisted dying’). It takes the form of a supposedly consequentialist argument as shown in Figure 1.

vulnerableatriskfig01.jpgFigure 1: A supposedly consequentialist argument.

But the argument's a complete sham.  Why?

What's the sham?

A quick check of the definition of ‘vulnerable’ reveals the real answer. The Oxford dictionary says "at risk". Dictionary.com offers “susceptible”, and Merriam-Webster defines it as “open to harm”. So, the two groups are in fact one and the same cohort as shown in Figure 2.

vulnerableatriskfig02.jpgFigure 2: The ‘original’ and ‘new’ groups are in fact identical.

It is a circular sham—a tautology or rhetorical pretence—to claim that a group defined as at risk, susceptible or open to harm will become at risk, susceptible or open to harm, as a consequence of some argued change statement. The same thing applies to ‘the weak’, who by context are ‘the vulnerable’ or ‘those at risk’.

Through its self-truth, the circular group claim wrongly lends the change statement’s claim a halo of validity, rendering it intuitively (even seductively) but falsely attractive, as shown in Figure 3.

vulnerableatriskfig03.jpgFigure 3: The circular group claim wrongly casts a halo of ‘validity’ on the change statement’s claim.

Principle and examples of the sham

So, in principle, this rhetorical sleight of hand takes the form:

Group A becomes same Group B if dis/approved change.

[            The circular sham            ]     Change statement

The claim about assisted dying can be seen for what it is, a proposal basking in ‘self-proving’ rhetoric:

The vulnerable will be at risk if we legalise assisted dying.”

Let’s make the principle absolutely clear with some further examples:

  1. You want people to reject democracy.

The self-interested will promote their own agenda if we hold so-called ‘democratic’ elections.”

Analysis: the ‘self-interested’ are one and the same people who vigorously ‘promote their own agenda’ and so it proves nothing about democratic elections despite the attractiveness of wanting to minimise self-interest—which is presented here as only possibly negative. Note also the pejorative expression ‘so-called’ and placing ‘democratic’ in quote marks so as to also tarnish the reputation of free and fair elections.

  1. You are making a case to go to war.

Our brave soldiers will be denied valour if we oppose this just war.”

Analysis: ‘bravery’ and ‘valour’ are the same thing, and something we esteem highly, regardless of whether this particular war is waged or not. Note that presenting the war as ‘just’ (i.e. ‘righteous’) compounds the ‘offence’ of denying brave soldiers the chance of valour.

  1. You want to compel people to attend church.

If we allow people to skip church, the damned will be condemned to eternal hell.”

Analysis: by definition, the damned are condemned to eternal hell (assuming hell exists) regardless of whether people attend church or not. Might private prayer or a life of service to others—not just church attendance—help avoid eternal hell?

  1. You want ‘men’s entertainment galleries’ to be banned.

Sexual predators will continue to abuse their prey unless we ban table-top dance bars.”

Analysis: Sexual predators by definition abuse prey whether table-top dance bars exist or not.

How does the sham fool us so easily?

How is it that the ‘proof’ of the circular group reference so easily transfers a halo of validity to the change statement?

It does so by the close and intuitive relationship of the group topic to the change statement topic—in the main case, death, and in the further examples: political system; war; religion; sex. When the group and change statement topics are closely related, the nature of the change statement doesn’t trigger critical examination and we are likely to automatically accept the effect of the change statement as intrinsically true and meaningful, when it’s not.

How do I spot the sham easily?

To test a statement for the circular sham, simply replace the topic-related change statement with an unrelated one, for example:

Sexual predators will continue to abuse their prey unless we put a price on carbon.

Heavens! In order to protect people from sex crimes we must put a price on carbon!

The vulnerable will be at risk if we wear yellow socks on Wednesdays.”

vulnerableatriskfig04.jpgFigure 4: To protect the vulnerable from being at risk, we must outlaw the wearing of yellow socks on Wednesdays.

It becomes immediately obvious, by replacing a related change statement topic with an unrelated one, just how invalid the halo effect is. The jarring topic difference triggers our critical faculties and we easily see through the sham.

What to do when you find the sham

Authentic and healthy community debate about weighty matters deserves better than misleading rhetoric.

If you encounter the flapdoodle of this circular sham, ask those making it to correct their error and advise them that:

“No proof is found by just going round.”

If you get no satisfaction, report the flapdoodle to us and we'll add it to our examples.

 

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Appendix: Real-world examples of assisted dying ‘vulnerable at risk’ flapdoodle

1.   Medical journal headline

Dr Bill Noble (2013). ‘Legalising assisted dying puts vulnerable patients at risk and doctors must speak up.’ British Medical Journal 346: f4062.

2.   Medical association television statement

Dr Gerard McGushin (for the Australian Medical Association) (2013), Channel 10 TV ‘The Project’, 16-Oct — ”Anyone who’s weak and vulnerable in our society will be at risk [from legalised assisted dying].”

3.   Published book statement

Prof. Margaret Somerville (2014), ‘Death Talk: The case against euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide’, 2nd Ed., McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal — “… the community, especially its vulnerable memberslegalized euthanasia …  could place even their continued existence at risk” (Preface, p. 6 of 38, Kobo edition).

4.   Supreme Court (Canada) determination

Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, “… persons who may be vulnerable to the influence of othersmay find themselves at risk at the hand of others[in the intentional termination of life]”, p. 558.

5.   Magazine article

Bill Muehlenberg (2008), Quadrant Online, 3-Sep, https://quadrant.org.au/opinion/bill-muehlenberg/2008/09/some-objections-to-legalised-euthanasia/ (viewed 28-May-2014), “The most vulnerable will be at riskwith legalised euthanasia”.

6.   Legislator’s speech in Parliament

Rev. Hon. Dr Gordon Moyes (2003), Speech by the Rev. Hon. Dr Gordon Moyes AC, MLC in the NSW Legislative Council Chamber on The Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill 2003, “The most vulnerable will be at risk[from] voluntary euthanasia”.

7.   British Medical Association Policy Statement on Assisted Dying

British Medical Association (2014), What is current BMA policy on assisted dying?, https://www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/ethics/end-of-life/the-bmas-position-on-physician-assisted-dying  (viewed 28-May-2014), “Permitting assisted dying for some could put vulnerable people at risk”.

8.   Newspaper quotes cleric

Rev. Dr Brendan McCarthy (2012), Assisted suicide comment: euthanasia puts the vulnerable at risk, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/9478399/Assisted-suicide-comment-euthanasia-puts-the-vulnerable-at-risk.html (viewed 28-May-2014).

9.   Anti-euthanasia campaign website

Alex Schadenberg (2013), Assisted dying law would bring risks for the vulnerable, http://alexschadenberg.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/assisted-dying-law-would-bring-risks.html (viewed 28-May-2014).

10. Anti-euthanasia blog

Paul Russell (2012), Euthanasia: Vigilance needed to protect the vulnerable, Newsweekly, https://ncc.org.au/newsweekly/uncategorized/5226-euthanasia-vigilance-needed-to-protect-the-vulnerable/ (viewed 28-May-2014) — “…the whole question of vulnerable patients at risk…”. [only the affirmative is argued]

11. Anti-euthanasia campaign website

Euthanasia Prevention Coalition [now the Patients Rights Council] (2007), ‘Turning the Tide’ DVD has sold more than 1000 copies, Newsletter October 2007 — “…the question of whether euthanasia puts vulnerable patients at risk…”. [only the affirmative is argued]

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"The vulnerable will be at risk if we legalise assisted dying."

This silly, nonsensical argument (flapdoodle) is promoted frequently and persistently in opposition to assisted dying law reform. Various forms are advanced not only by lobbyists, commentators, journalists and politicians, but even by judges and professional medical bodies (see examples).

But the statements are flapdoodle because they use circular rhetoric dressed up as a profound or self-evidential truth to fabricate a case for or against change.

The fabrication is to present ‘the vulnerable’ and people ‘at risk’ as different groups. They aren’t. The Oxford English dictionary defines ‘the vulnerable’ as “at risk”, and Merriam-Webster agrees: “open to harm”.

Therefore it’s a circular sham to argue that a group becomes itself on the basis of some arbitrary change. We could equally say:

“The vulnerable will be at risk if we wear yellow socks on Wednesdays.

Indeed, if you come across an example of this circular sham, ask the author to correct it because:

“No case is made when a circle is laid.

If they don't, let us know!

 

Examples

  1. Magazine article: Bill Muehlenberg (2008), Quadrant Online, 3-Sep, https://quadrant.org.au/opinion/bill-muehlenberg/2008/09/some-objections-to-legalised-euthanasia/ (viewed 28-May-2014), “The most vulnerable will be at risk … with legalised euthanasia”.
     
  2. Anti-euthanasia campaign website: Alex Schadenberg (2013), Assisted dying law would bring risks for the vulnerable, http://alexschadenberg.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/assisted-dying-law-would-bring-risks.html (viewed 28-May-2014).
     
  3. Legislator’s speech in Parliament: Rev. Hon. Dr Gordon Moyes (2003), Speech by the Rev. Hon. Dr Gordon Moyes AC, MLC in the NSW Legislative Council Chamber on The Voluntary Euthanasia Trial (Referendum) Bill 2003, “The most vulnerable will be at risk … [from] voluntary euthanasia”.
     
  4. Professional medical body statement: British Medical Association (2014), What is current BMA policy on assisted dying?, https://www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/ethics/end-of-life/the-bmas-position-on-physician-assisted-dying  (viewed 28-May-2014), “Permitting assisted dying for some could put vulnerable people at risk”.
     
  5. Supreme Court (Canada) determination: Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519, “… persons who may be vulnerable to the influence of others … may find themselves at risk at the hand of others … [in the intentional termination of life]”, p. 558.

 

Want a forensic analysis of the circular sham and how it so easily works to fool us? Check out the Full Monty here...

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The opinion piece in The Age.

In today’s Fairfax press, Sydney woman Mary Ticinovic advances a number of reasons as to why she believes that assisted dying is not merciful. The by-line identifies her as a “clinical psychologist”. But her arguments are not founded on the basic tenets of psychology. How so?

Read Mary’s opinion piece in The Age

All life is precious

Mary argues that to support assisted dying is to go “against the principle that all life is precious.” She offers no substantive explanation, invoking the notion of ‘human worth’, stating that it exists regardless of the health state or suffering of the person, and complaining that assisted dying promotes the idea that “your life is no longer worth living”.

These are not psychological arguments. We can agree that life is precious. But reluctantly deciding to hasten one’s death in the face of intolerable and unrelievable terminal suffering doesn’t negate that preciousness. Indeed, to some people, choosing assisted dying can evidence the preciousness of one’s very capacities and values as a human.

Whose standards?

Mary further muses over “by whose standards would we judge if life is not worthwhile any more”, as though this is only some vague theoretical argument amongst philosophers or doctors. This is not a psychological argument, either. Under assisted dying law reform, it is only the dying individual’s world-view and circumstances that determine whether he or she feels life is worth living: not anyone else. General philosophical theory doesn’t come into it.

She further argues that assisted dying “promotes a utilitarian view of humanity”. This is not a psychological argument, either. Nor is it valid. Indeed, legalised assisted dying respects the very nature of the diversity of humanity by enabling the world-views many people hold most dear: that of making rational choices consistent with their own beliefs, values and circumstances. Some patients, for example in Oregon, are deeply religious and believe that their God is compassionate and understands and respects their choice to avoid intolerable suffering. That’s not utilitarian at all.

Harm and the Hippocratic Oath

Mary invokes the Hippocratic Oath said by her medical friends to oblige doctors to “do no harm” and that the medical role is “in healing and helping the patient to be restored to health.” This is simplistic nonsense, not a psychological argument.

Firstly, doctors do harm all the time: think of surgical procedures or chemotherapy. Many medical interventions do harm, but we accept the harm because we expect there to be a commensurately greater good as a result.

Secondly, medical practice cannot always “restore the patient to health” as Mary exclusively puts it. What then? The dying patient may judge that the unrelievable suffering they will experience along the path to death is a greater harm than dying a little earlier. And, doctors also have a primary duty to relieve suffering, which Mary doesn’t mention. What is under review is whether a doctor may participate in the relief of intolerable and unrelievable suffering— by hastening death—if the patient believes this is the lesser harm.

Thirdly, the Hippocratic Oath is around 2,300 years old. It requires doctors to swear allegiance to ancient Greek gods. It forbids women from becoming doctors. It requires current doctors to train the next generation free of charge, and it forbids surgery. Contemporary doctors don’t take it, and it’s certainly not “part of training” as Mary mistakenly states.

None of these are psychology arguments.

'Sucker’s choice'

Mary then argues that requiring dying patients to endure until the end promotes—and that assisted dying prevents—“fostering gratitude”, “reconciling hurts or differences with family members or friends” and “showing them strategies or different ways to approach their pain and suffering”.

But, in jurisdictions where assisted dying is legal, for example in Oregon in the USA, these are precisely things that are encouraged under assisted dying. Doctors are required to inform applicants of available medical and palliative interventions. Family gathers on notice of an anticipated death, music and poetry is shared, and expressions of love, devotion and gratitude are exchanged.

If a dying patient has no intention of reconciling with family or reflecting on approaches to dealing with their pain and suffering under an assisted dying law, precisely the same intention applies to the current regime that requires the patient to endure until the end. To assume a difference is a false dichotomy.

Obligatory compassion

Mary also argues that assisted dying ought to remain outlawed because “nursing a sick loved one is a way to give back”. This is yet another specious non-psychology argument. It promotes the ‘right’ of the ‘nurse’ to express love and devotion through ‘caring interventions’ at the expense of the dying patient’s own world view and deeply-held wish for a hastened death. Now who’s being utilitarian?

The upshot

I ran Mary’s opinion piece past an experienced psychologist, who described it as little to do with psychology. Note that neither of us has experience of or is commenting on Mary’s expertise as a clinical psychologist: she may indeed be a very good one.

My associate wondered out loud if Mary’s arguments were based more on underlying religious views than anything else. I agreed: they seemed to me remarkably consistent with the arguments advanced by religious opponents, even though they avoided directly religious words. So I did a little research.

It turns out that Mary is a committed and active Sydney Catholic.* Evidence abounds of her devotion to the Catholic tradition, and I commend her for her conscientious reflective practice and participation in it.

However, I argue that neither the stated psychological qualification nor the unstated religious affiliation make the offered arguments valid.

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* By way of fairness, I place on the record that I am agnostic.


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The F files
 

The public conversation about assisted dying law reform has been influenced by misinformation from opponents for far too long. Often, misinformation is simply given in ignorance, but sometimes not. It is mandatory that a conversation as important as assisted dying for those suffering at the end of life is informed by accurate information and evidential and reasoned views. Arguments that deceive or attempt to shut down the conversation have no place.

Whether misinformation is Fearmongering, Filibuster, Flip-flop, Flapdoodle, Fudge, or Fiction or Faith, the F files identifies misinformation and those who are providing it.

You can help by sending records of misinformation claims to us, and asking claimants to correct the errors.

 

Fundamental forms of misinformation

fearmongering.jpg      

Fearmonger

Represent something as considerably more sinister or dangerous than it is when judged by objective criteria.

filibuster.jpg  

Filibuster

Artificial and overly-lengthy process used in an attempt to stall or block a political outcome.

flip-flop.jpg  

Flip-flop

Multiple inconsistent or opposed arguments used to justify a position.

flapdoodle.jpg  

Flapdoodle

An argument that superficially seems intuitively attractive, true or real, but is in fact meaningless or nonsensical.

fudge.jpg  

Fudge

Unscientific analysis (e.g. selective data) used to support an argument that is not supported by proper, full analysis.

fiction.jpg  

Fiction

A thing that is untrue, or invented or feigned by imagination with no sound or verifiable evidence.

faith.jpg  

Faith

An argument that all others should adhere to a particular religion's values, tenets and rules.

 

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